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Abstract
Product update is an operation on models introduced into epistemic logic
in order to represent a broad class of informational events. If adding modal-
ities representing product update to a language does not alter its expressive
power then we say that the language is ‘closed for product update’. The basic
modal language is known to be closed for product update [Baltag et al., 1999,
Gerbrandy, 1999]. We establish that monadic second order logic is closed
for product update (Theorem 5). Our technique is to pass via an intermediate
language with what we call ‘action nominals’. We obtain as corollaries that
propositionally quantified modal logic is closed for product update, as is the
modal µ-calculus.
1 Preamble
The semantic operation of product update was introduced into epistemic logic as
a generalisation of relativisation. Where logics including relativisation operators
can reason about public announcements, logics with ‘action’ product update op-
erators enable us to reason about information change under a much broader class
of informational events, allowing for arbitrary levels of uncertainty amongst the
agents modelled. Adding action operators for product update into formal languages
therefore opened the door for the logical analysis of social and formal protocols,
including situations of deception and suspicion, and more generally any kind of
uncertainty concerning what informational event is taking place.
It has been established [Baltag et al., 1999] that adding such action operators
does not increase the expressivity of the basic modal language, but does increase
the expressivity of the language with common knowledge. A natural question when
looking at a modal language is whether adding operators for product update in-
creases the expressivity or not. We answer here three instances of that question,
for very expressive modal languages, each of which has some sort of second-order
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quantification, and so is not less expressive than the first-order correspondence lan-
guage. These languages are those of: monadic second order logic (MSO), proposi-
tionally quantified modal logic, and the modal µ-calculus. In each case we find that
the logics are closed for product update, i.e. that adding action modalities does not
increase the expressive power over the class of all (relational) models. Our method
is first to prove that MSO is product closed, for which we introduce a novel tech-
nique involving ‘action nominals’; and then to use characterisation results of the
other two languages as fragments of MSO to obtain the results concerning them as
corollaries of the main result concerning MSO.
2 Product closure
We define in this section what we mean by ‘closure for relativisation’ and ‘closure
for product update’. These two ‘closures’ of a logic1 are best defined as in terms
of two semantic operations on its models.
If M = (Ω, R, V ) is a relational model2 and A ⊆ Ω, we write M|A for the
relativisation ofM toA, defined as (A,R|A,V |A), whereR|A df= R∩(A×A) and
(V |A)(p)
df
= V (p) ∩A. Then we say that a language L is closed for relativisation
just when for any pair of formulas {ϕ,A} ∈ L, there is a formula ψ ∈ L such
that for any model M, JψKM = JϕKM|JAKM . To spell this definition out: for any
formula ϕ, there is a formula ψ that is true in modelM just when ϕ ‘will be’ true in
the relativised model M|JAKM. A natural interpretation of relativisation in modal
models where the accessibility relation is taken to be epistemic is of an action
of public announcement. Public announcements were introduced and discussed
in this context in [Plaza, 1989, Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997, Benthem, 2003].
To repeat the temporal idiom, ψ can be thought of as saying that ϕ will be the case
after announcement of A.
To say that a language L is closed for relativisation is equivalent to saying
that if we were to enrich L with ‘relativisation modalities’ then we would obtain a
language with exactly the same expressive power as L. That is, consider another
language L!, obtained from L by addition of a family of modalities 〈!A〉 for each
A ∈ L, endowed with the following semantics:
M, ω  〈!ψ〉ϕ
df
⇔M, ω  ψ and M|JψKM, ω  ϕ
L is closed for relativisation iff L! has precisely the same expressive power as L.
One can show by a ‘compositional analysis’ of its semantics that, for example,
the basic modal language L is closed for relativisation. That is, one gives so-
called ‘reduction axioms’, validities of the form 〈!ψ〉O(ϕ) ≡ Q(〈!ψ〉ϕ), for each
connective O of the language. This technique, introduced for L in [Plaza, 1989],
1Or, as shall say, of a language, taking it for granted that we are talking about the logic of that
language over the class of all relational models.
2So with Ω a non-empty set, R ⊆ Ω× Ω and V :W → 2W .
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shows not only that a language is closed for relativisation but, when Q is com-
putable from O, that it is computably so closed.
A similar technique can be employed to show that a language is closed for
‘product update’. Product update was developed in the context of epistemic logic
in [Gerbrandy, 1999, Baltag et al., 1999]. Semantically, it is a more complicated
operation than relativisation. In order to define product update we need to define
‘event models’, defined in terms of the language L. An event model is a tuple
(Σ, E, PRE), where Σ is a finite non-empty set of ‘events’, E ⊆ Σ × Σ is a
relation over Σ and PRE : Σ → L gives the ‘precondition’ formula for each
‘event’. Product update ⊗ is then a function that, given a model and an event
model, returns a new model. It is defined as follows:
M⊗A
df
=


{(ω,α) ∈ Ω×A | M, ω  Preα},
{((ω,α), (ω′, α′)) | ωRω′ & αEα′},
{(p, {(ω,α) | ω ∈ V (p)}) | p ∈ PROP}


For any event model A = (Σ, E, PRE), we could expand the language L to a
language Lα by adding a collection of operators 〈α〉 for each event α ∈ Σ, with
the following semantics:
M, ω  〈α〉ϕ
df
⇔M, ω  Preα and M⊗A, (ω,α)  ϕ,
We say that a language L is closed for product update just if any language Lα
formed in this way has the same expressive power as L. Equivalently (for all
languages L that we consider), L is closed for product update just if for every ψ ∈
L and each event α there is some ϕ ∈ L such that in any model, J〈α〉ψK = JϕK.
3 MSO
We now define the first logic that we will consider: propositionally quantified
modal logic with a global modality. The language L∃,U is given by the follow-
ing Backus-Naur form:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ∃p.ϕ | Uϕ
We assume, throughout the paper, standard abbreviations like ∀, ⊃, ∨. If M =
(Ω, R, V ), then ‘M[p 7→ X]’ denotes the model (Ω, R, V ′), where V ′(p) = X
and for all q 6= p, V ′(q) = V (q). The semantics of L∃,U are as follows, where
M = (Ω, R, V ) is a model.
M, ω  p
df
⇔ ω ∈ V (p)
M, ω  ¬ϕ
df
⇔ M, ω 2 ϕ
M, ω  ϕ ∧ ψ
df
⇔ M, ω  ϕ and M, ω  ψ
M, ω  ϕ
df
⇔ ∀ω′(ωRω′ ⇒ ω′  ϕ)
M, ω  ∃p.ϕ
df
⇔ ∃X ⊆ Ω :M[p 7→ X], ω  ϕ
M, ω  Uϕ
df
⇔ ∀ω′ ∈ Ω, ω′  ϕ
3
The same language but without the universal modality U was first studied in [Fine, 1970],
and we will consider it below in section 5. The language L∃,U is known to be a
translation into modal notation of monadic second-order logic LMSO. That is:
for every LMSO-formula ϕ(x) with one free variable (“LMSO-type”) there is a
L∃,U -formula true at those points of which ϕ(x) is true, and vice-versa. This is the
recursive definition of LMSO:
ϕ ::= Px | xRy | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ∃xϕ | ∃Pϕ
The semantics of the first-order part of LMSO are standard, and the propositional
quantifier ∃P has the natural interpretation, as quantifying unrestrictedly over sub-
sets of the domain. The only slightly tricky clause of the translation between
LMSO and L∃,U is the following:
TR(∃xϕ(x)) = ∃p.(Ep ∧ ∀q.(U(q ⊃ p) ⊃ U(p ⊃ q)) ∧ ϕ(p)).
This equivalence means that we prove about the expressivity of ∃,U can equiva-
lently be read as being about LMSO-types, and we can refer to L∃,U as “MSO”.
4 MSO is product closed
To warm up we will remark that L∃,U is closed under relativisation. In order to do
this we want a ‘reduction axiom’ for the quantifier ∃p. The following Fact states
such a reduction axiom:
Fact 1. If p does not occur in A, then:
 〈!A〉∃p.ϕ ≡ ∃p.(U(p ⊃ A) ∧ 〈!A〉ϕ)
Fact 1 plays the central part in the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. L∃,U is computably closed for relativisation.
(Proposition 2 follows from Fact 1, and in any case would be an immediate
corollary of Theorem 5 below.)
In the rest of this section we will work towards Theorem 5, which states that
L∃,U is also (computably) closed for product update. Fix some event model (Σ, E, PRE)
with Σ = {α0, . . . , αn−1}. We will show that the language L∃,U,α obtained by
adding event modalities 〈α〉 for each α ∈ Σ has precisely the same expressive
power as the original language L∃,U .
In order to show that L∃,U is closed for relativisation we were able to give a
reduction axiom for the quantifier ∃p. The case for product update is a little bit
more subtle. We will give a reduction axiom for the quantifier ∃p, but we do not
see how to do this directly in the language L∃,U . Therefore we take a detour via
some additional rather artificial vocabulary that allows expressing a subset of the
product space in terms of a sequence of subsets of the initial model.
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This new vocabulary consists of nullary modalities j0, . . . , jn. Intuitively speak-
ing, these action nominals will say, in the model M× A, that action αi has just
occurred. We call these ji’s ‘action nominals’. So the language Lα,j is formed
from the language Lα by including the action nominals, but only when they oc-
cur under the scope of an action modality 〈α〉. To formally specify the language
L∃,U,α,j, we consider first the set of sentences S∃,U,α,j , for which we cannot for-
mulate a semantics, and therefore do not use the word ‘language’.
ϕ ::= p | ji | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ∃p.ϕ | Uϕ | 〈α〉ϕ.
The problem in giving a semantics for S∃,U,α,j is precisely that action nominals can
occur outside of the scope of action modalities, in which case we have no way to
evaluate them.3 So we define the language L∃,U,α,j as follows, where ψ can take
values in S∃,U,α,j:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ∃p.ϕ | Uϕ | 〈α〉ψ.
We have said what the intuitive meaning of the action nominals is. Formally, the
semantics of action nominals are as follows:
M⊗A, (ω,α)  ji ⇔ α = αi
Since action nominals can only occur under the scope of at least one action op-
erator, this semantic clause is sufficient. Notice that action nominals have simple
reduction axioms:
Remark 3. The following equivalences hold:
 〈αi〉ji ≡ Preαi
 〈αi〉jk ≡ ⊥ for i 6= k.
More importantly, it is now possible to write down a reduction axiom for the
quantifier ∃p:
Lemma 4. If none of p0, . . . , pn−1 occur in ϕ or any Preαi , then:
 〈α〉∃p.ϕ ≡ ∃p0 . . . ∃pn−1.(
∧
i∈n
U(pi ⊃ Preαi) ∧ 〈α〉ϕ(
∨
i∈n
(pi ∧ ji)))
Proof. We can prove this equivalence directly by the following string of equiva-
lences:
M, ω  〈α〉∃p.ϕ(p)
iff
M⊗A, (ω,α)  ∃p.ϕ(p)
3One natural option might be to say that in general M, ω  ji holds when there is some model
M′ with a point ω′ such that (M′ ⊗A, (ω′, αi)) is isomorphic to (M, ω), but we have no need for
such an option here.
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iff
∃X ⊆ {(ω′, α′) | M, ω′  Preα′},M⊗A[p 7→ X], (ω,α)  ϕ(p)
iff
∃X ⊆
⋃
i∈n
({ω′ ∈ Ω | ω′  Preαi} × {αi}) :M⊗A[p 7→ X], (ω,α)  ϕ(p)
iff
∃X0 ∈ {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′  Preα0}, . . . ,Xn−1 ∈ {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′  Preαn−1} :
M⊗A[p 7→
⋃
Xi × {αi}], (ω,α)  ϕ(p)
iff
∃X0 ∈ {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′  Preα0}, . . . ,Xn−1 ∈ {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′  Preαn−1} :
M⊗A[p0 7→ Xi × {αi}, . . . , pn−1 7→ Xn−1 × {xn−1}], (ω,α)  ϕ(
∨
i∈n
pi)
(where p0, . . . , pn−1 are distinct and do not occur in ϕ or any Preαi), iff
∃X0 ∈ {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′  Preα0}, . . . ,Xn−1 ∈ {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′  Preαn−1} :
M⊗A[p0 7→ Xi × Σ, . . . , pn−1 7→ Xn−1 × Σ], (ω,α)  ϕ(
∨
i∈n
(pi ∧ ji))
iff
∃X0 ∈ {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′  Preα0}, . . . ,Xn−1 ∈ {ω
′ ∈ Ω | ω′  Preαn−1} :
M[p0 7→ Xi, . . . , pn−1 7→ Xn−1], ω  〈α〉ϕ(
∨
i∈n
(pi ∧ ji))
iff
∃X0, . . . ,Xn−1 ⊆ Ω :M, ω 
∧
i∈n
U(pi ⊃ Preαi) ∧ 〈α〉ϕ(
∨
i∈n
(pi ∧ ji))
iff
M, ω, ∃p0, . . . ,∃pn−1.(
∧
i∈n
U(pi ⊃ Preαi) ∧ 〈α〉ϕ(
∨
i∈n
(pi ∧ ji)))
These reduction axioms (from Remark 3 and Lemma 4) are what we use to
establish the product closure of L∃,U .
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Theorem 5. L∃,U is computably closed for product update. I.e.:
∀α ∈ Σ,∀ψ ∈ L∃,U ,∃χ ∈ L∃,U :  χ ≡ 〈α〉ψ,
where χ is effectively computable from ψ and (Σ, α).
Theorem 5 follows from Lemma 6 below, which is phrased in terms of the set
of sentences S∃,U,j , defined recursively as:
ϕ ::= p | ji | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | ∃p.ϕ | Uϕ
It is in terms of S∃,U,j, which clearly contains L∃,U , that we are able to prove a re-
duction lemma, Lemma 6 below. Since S∃,U,j clearly contains L∃,U , then Theorem
5 is an immediate corollary of Lemma 6.
Lemma 6.
∀α ∈ Σ,∀ψ ∈ S∃,U,j,∃χ ∈ L∃,U :  χ ≡ 〈α〉ψ
Proof. We would like to prove this by induction on ψ, by using our reduction
axioms, and using the following inductive hypothesis, where γ is less complex
than ψ:
∃δ ∈ S∃,U,j :  δ ≡ 〈α〉γ (1)
First we need an appropriate notion of complexity: since at the new case to be
treated at the inductive stage, the propositional quantifier case, the reduction axion
increases the complexity of the formula, by the standard definition of complexity,
we suppose we have a definition according to which formulas with greater quan-
tifier depth have greater complexity, and that within that stratification the standard
notion of formula complexity applies. Let ε(ψ) be the number of propositional
existential quantifiers ∃ in ψ.
Notice that we can immediately prove (1) for the case when ε(ψ) = 0, for then
ψ ∈ LU,j , so the new cases to be treated are just (a) ψ := ji with α = αi and (b)
ψ := ji with α 6= αi. Here we use the ‘reduction axioms’ from Remark ??: for
(a),  〈α〉ji ≡ ⊤, and for (b)  〈α〉ji ≡ ⊥.
Therefore it will suffice, to prove the Lemma, to suppose that:
(1) holds for ε(ψ) < k (2)
holds, and then to show that (1) holds for ε(ψ) = k (k ∈ N+).
Again, the ‘old’ cases are known, so we go straight to the new case:
Let ψ := ∃p.γ(p). Here we choose some q0, . . . , qn−1 not occurring in either
γ or any of the PREα’s, and letting γ′ = γ(
∨
i∈n(qi ∧ ji)), define ϕ as follows:
ϕ := ∃q0 . . . ∃qn−1.(
∧
i∈n
U(qi ⊃ Preαi) ∧ 〈α〉γ
′).
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Then by Lemma 4,  ϕ ≡ 〈α〉ψ. Furthermore, notice that γ′ ∈ S∃,U,j , and
that ε(γ′) = ε(ψ) − 1 < ε(ψ). So we can invoke our inductive hypothesis (2),
establishing that there exists δ ∈ L∃,U such that:
 δ ≡ 〈α〉γ′. (3)
It immediately follows that  θ ≡ ϕ, where:
θ := ∃q0 . . . ∃qn−1.(
∧
i∈n
U(qi ⊃ Preαi) ∧ δ)
Then since θ ∈ L∃,U we are done.
5 A corollary for L∃
The language L∃ is the language L∃,U without the global modality U . The ab-
sence of a global modality means that L∃ is a ‘local’ language: as observed in
[Benthem, 1983], L∃ is invariant under generated submodels. [Cate, 2006] shows
further that it is a proper fragment of the generated-submodel-invariant sublan-
guage of L∃,U and indeed establishes a second-order analogue of the van Benthem-
Rosen theorem, characterising the expressivity of L∃ as a fragment of MSO. We
need some more definitions in order to formulate the characterisation given in
[Cate, 2006] of L∃ as a fragment of L∃,U : Firstly, for k ∈ N, and any point ω
in the domain of the model M, we denote by Mkω the submodel of M gener-
ated from going at most k steps along R from ω. Let K(ϕ) denote the class of
pointed models defined by ϕ, i.e. such that for any pointed4 model (M, ω), we
have (M, ω) ∈ K ⇔ M, ω  ϕ. We say that ϕ has degree k (for k ∈ N) when
for all pointed models (M, ω), (M, ω) ∈ K(ϕ) ⇔ (Mkω, ω) ∈ K(ϕ). If there is
some k ∈ N such that ϕ has degree k, then let deg(ϕ) denote the least such k, and
∞ otherwise. Then the following theorem characterises L∃ as a fragment of L∃,U :
Theorem 7 ([Cate, 2006, Theorem 6]). A formula ϕ ∈ L∃,U is equivalent to a
formula of L∃ just if deg(ϕ) 6=∞
We now want to show that having finite degree is a property that is preserved
by adding action modalities:
Lemma 8. If ϕ and all of PREα0 , . . . , PREαn have finite degree then 〈α〉ϕ has
finite degree.
Proof. Notice that
for any m ≤ k then if ϕ has degree m, ϕ also has degree k. (4)
Let k⋆ = max({deg(PREα0), . . . , deg(PREαn )} + deg(ϕ). Then (4) is used to
show that
(M⊗A)
deg(ϕ)
(ω,α) is a submodel of (M
k⋆
ω ⊗A),
which is in turn used to prove that deg(〈α〉ϕ) ≤ k⋆.
4A ‘pointed model’ is a model (Ω, R, V ) together with a point ω ∈ Ω.
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Then as a corollary of Theorem 5 we also obtain the closure of the proposition-
ally quantified modal language L∃:
Corollary 9. L∃ is closed for product update. I.e.:
∀α ∈ Σ,∀ψ ∈ L∃,∃χ ∈ L∃ :  χ ≡ 〈α〉ψ,
Proof. Take ϕ ∈ L∃ and consider 〈α〉ϕ; since L∃ ⊂ L∃,U , then by Theorem 5
there is a formula ψ′ ∈ L∃,U that is equivalent to 〈α〉ϕ. Since ϕ ∈ L∃, we know
that ϕ has finite degree, and then, by Lemma 8 that 〈α〉ϕ also has finite degree.
Therefore, since ψ′ and 〈α〉ϕ are equivalent, ψ′ has finite degree, and therefore by
Theorem 7 is equivalent to some ψ ∈ L∃.
6 A corollary for Lµ
In this section we observe that, similarly, the relativisation closure of the modal
fixpoint language Lµ is a corollary of our Theorem 5. The closure of Lµ is already
obtained in [Benthem and Ikegami, 2008]. The proof of those authors is more di-
rect, but our proof, just as for L∃ in the previous section, is very quick because it
again uses a semantic characterisation result. Lµ is defined as follows:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ | νp.ϕ,
where crucially in νp.ϕ, ϕ must be positive in p (i.e. all occurrences of p must be
under the scope of an even number of negations ¬). The new semantic clause for
ν is as follows:
Jνp.ϕK =
⋃
{X ⊆ Ω | ∀ω ∈ X,M[p 7→ X], ω  ϕ}
The ν operator expresses greatest fixpoints.5 It is easy to see that Lµ is a strict
fragment of L∃,U , since we can define νp.ϕ as
∃p(p ∧ U(p ⊃ ϕ)).
Theorem 10 below is a more remarkable result, precisely characterising Lµ in
terms of L∃,U is proved in [Janin and Walukiewicz, 1996]. We say that a modal
formula ϕ is bisimulation-invariant just if for any pointed models (M, ω) and
(M′, ω′) that are bisimilar6, M, ω  ϕ⇔M′, ω′  ϕ.
Theorem 10. A formula ϕ ∈ L∃,U is equivalent to anLµ-formula iff it is bisimulation-
invariant.
5More specifically: Jνp.ϕ(p)K is the greatest fixpoint of the function Fϕ : 2Ω → 2Ω defined by
Fϕ(X) = Jϕ(p)KM[p 7→X]. The requirement that ϕ be positive in p ensures that Fϕ is monotone and
therefore has, as a consequence of the Knaster-Tarski theorem, a greatest fixpoint.
6For a definition of the fundamental modal logic notion of bisimulation, see e.g.
[Blackburn et al., 2001].
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Proof. Theorem 10 follows immediately from [Janin and Walukiewicz, 1996, The-
orem 11], given that Lµ formulas are bisimulation-invariant.
That elegant result is what leads us to see that Lµ is also closed for product
update. We just need one additional lemma, which says that adding product-update
modalities does not break bisimulation-invariance:
Lemma 11. If ϕ and all of PREα1 , . . . , PREαn are bisimulation-invariant then
〈α〉ϕ is bisimulation-invariant.
Proof. Take any bisimilar models M and M′, and a point ω and ω′ in the do-
main of each. It will suffice to show that M, ω  ϕ iff M′, ω′  ϕ. Let Z
be a bisimulation for those models, with ωZω′. Using the fact that the PREαi’s
are bisimulation-invariant, the relation Y defined as follows can be shown to be a
bisimulation between M⊗A and M′ ⊗A:
(s, β)Y (t, γ)
df
⇔ sZt & β = γ.
Then since ϕ is also bisimulation-invariant, we know that M⊗A, (ω,α)  ϕ iff
M′ ⊗A, (ω′, α)  ϕ, which is equivalent to what we set out to establish.
Corollary 12. Lµ is closed for product update, i.e.:
∀α ∈ Σ,∀ψ ∈ Lµ,∃χ ∈ Lµ :  χ ≡ 〈α〉ψ,
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Corollary 9.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that monadic second-order logic is closed for product update. We
did this using ‘action nominals’, which served as a sort of ‘memory’ in the reduc-
tion axiom process. This book-keeping allowed us to keep track of which action
had occurred, and therefore to ‘talk about’ subsets of the product model in terms
of sequences of subsets of the initial model. Although we pass via a language with
action nominals, Lemma 6 does specify a method that, given a formula ψ ∈ L∃,U
yields a concrete formula χ ∈ L∃,U that is equivalent to 〈α〉ψ.
We obtained as corollaries the facts that propositionally quantified modal logic,
and the modal fixpoint calculus, are closed for product update. This was in each
case achieved by using a semantic characterisation result. The non-constructive
nature of our proofs of these corollaries, unlike that of Lemma 6, mean that they
do not establish that either propositionally quantified modal logic or the modal
fixpoint calculus are computably closed.
Acknowledgements
Participants in the ILLC’s Dynamic Logic seminar series provided helpful com-
ments, especially Johan van Benthem, who suggested Corollary 12.
10
References
[Baltag et al., 1999] Alexandru Baltag, Lawrence S. Moss, and Slawomir Solecki.
The logic of public announcements, common knowledge and private suspicions.
Technical Report SEN-R9922, Centrum voor Wiskunde en Informatica, 1999.
[Benthem and Ikegami, 2008] Johan van Benthem and Daisuke Ikegami. Modal
fixed-point logic and changing models. In A. Avron, N. Dershowitz, and A. Ra-
binovich, editors, Pillars of Computer Science, volume 4800 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 146–165. Springer, 2008.
[Benthem, 1983] Johan van Benthem. Modal Logic and Classical Logic. Bib-
liopolis, 1983.
[Benthem, 2003] Johan van Benthem. One is a lonely number. ILLC Prepublica-
tion, PP-2003(07), 2003.
[Blackburn et al., 2001] Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke, and Yde Venema.
Modal Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2001.
[Cate, 2006] Balder ten Cate. Expressivity of second-order propositional modal
logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35:209–223, 2006.
[Fine, 1970] Kit Fine. Propositional quantifiers in modal logic. Theoria, 36:336–
346, 1970.
[Gerbrandy and Groeneveld, 1997] Jelle Gerbrandy and Willem Groeneveld. Rea-
soning about information change. Journal of Logic, Language, and Information,
6:147–169, 1997.
[Gerbrandy, 1999] Jelle Gerbrandy. Bisimulations on Planet Kripke. PhD thesis,
ILLC, Amsterdam, 1999.
[Janin and Walukiewicz, 1996] David Janin and Igor Walukiewicz. On the ex-
pressive completeness of the propositional mu-calculus with respect to monadic
second order logic. In CONCUR ’96: Proceedings of the 7th International Con-
ference on Concurrency Theory, pages 263–277, London, UK, 1996. Springer-
Verlag.
[Plaza, 1989] Jan A. Plaza. Logics of public communications. In M. L. Emrich,
M. S. Pfeifer, M. Hadzikadic, and Z. W. Ras, editors, Proceedings of the 4th
International Symposium on Methodologies for Intelligent Systems, pages 201–
216, 1989.
11
